Abstract: The paper asks whether neuroeconomics will make instrumental use of neuroscience to adjudicate existing disputes in economics or be more seriously transformed by neuroscience in ways that might transform economics. The paper pursues the question by asking how neuroscience constructs an understanding of individuals as whole persons. The body of the paper is devoted to examining two approaches: Don Ross"s neurocellular approach to neuroeconomics and Joseph Dumit"s cultural anthropological science organization approach.
questions, and one way in which this can be done is by looking through the lens of other sciences. And, in the case of neuroeconomics, clearly, the status and significance of neuroscience as a twenty-first century pioneer science offers a remarkable opportunity to do this.
In this paper, then, I ask how neuroscience might inform economics in a fundamental way with respect to an issue which seems central to deep neuroscience concerns and which offers a natural point of contact with economics, namely, what the individual is, or in language less familiar in economics, how we understand the identity of individuals. The individual, of course, has been a primary theoretical construct in economics for over a century, and the preference conception of the individual has been standard in economics for the last half century. But all of the new research programs in economics of the past several decades question the standard view, indeed in different and in some cases in far-reaching ways (Davis, 2009 ). Thus it is fair to say that the question, "what is the individual," is on the agenda at the research frontier in economics. In neuroscience, the matter is even more salient. Neuroscientists put single individuals into the scanner, where they treat them there as collections of relatively independent neural structures whose coordination is theorized in different ways according to the goals of the research team involved and the kinds of phenomena being investigated. Neuroscience begins with the disaggregated rather than whole individual, and its multiplicity of its research concerns inevitably produces a multiplicity of theories regarding how individuals function as single persons. At the same time, given the organization of the neuroscience community, no one has any special interest in asking how this might be true in general. Indeed, that is likely to simply seem a poorly formulated question for most neuroscientists.
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 3 This paper, then, investigates this possible point of contact between neuroeconomics and neuroscience by examining and comparing two distinct points of entry regarding thinking about individuals: Don Ross"s (2005) game theoretic neurocellular approach to neuroeconomics and Joseph Dumit"s (2004) science system of organization approach to neuroscience. The two approaches employ significantly different underlying assumptions, yet can be shown to operate by means of strategies of analysis that mirror one another, and jointly map out a socialinstitutional space in which we seek to explain the behavior of single individuals. The first section of the paper begins with an assessment of the behavioral economics-based neuroeconomics view of the individual in neuroeconomic research, and then the second and third sections turn to the Ross and Dumit views about individuals in neuroeconomics and neuroscience respectively. The fourth section discusses the relationship between their different types of explanations, and argues for a combined explanatory strategy appropriate to the subject of individual economic behavior. The concluding section comments briefly on neuroeconomics as a new research program in economics.
i. Individuals in neuroeconomics
An influential view of neuroeconomics, promoted by Colin Camerer and others, is that neuroeconomics is an extension and development of behavioral economics which aims to secure additional new evidence from neuroscientific research for many of the conclusions reached by psychologists and behavioral economists about the behavior of individual economic agents (e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005; Camerer, 2006 Camerer, , 2008 . As Ross aptly puts it, on this view neuroeconomics is "behavioural economics in the scanner" (Ross, 2008, p. 374) . Ross opposes to this conception an understanding of neuroeconomics he terms "neurocellular economics" which uses the modeling techniques and mathematics of economics -specifically optimization and equilibrium analysis -to represent the functioning of different parts of the brain without making any assumptions about how neurocellular processes are related to the individual as a whole. For Ross, whether in neuroeconomics or other areas of investigation, an agent ought to be defined in minimalist fashion as an optimizer in a narrowly defined reward space (Ross, 200., . More fully, an agent is "any system that observes certain consistency conditions in behavior, such that it can be interpreted as if it is maximizing the value of a
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 4 function that maps a system of preferences over commodity bundles onto the real numbers" (Ross, 2005, p. 245) . Note that there is nothing in this definition that requires economic agents be identified as single individuals -or as Ross puts it, as "whole people" (Ross, 2008, p. 378) .
Indeed the objective functions that agents optimize, whether they be utility functions as in the passage above or production functions, can in principle be ascribed to all types of agents, including sub-personal agents -"that neuron, or that neurotransmitter system, or that quasimodular circuit" (Ibid., p. 379). In a word, Ross rejects the idea that any sort of whole person "anthropomorphism" is the necessary starting point neuroeconomics or indeed any other sort of investigation that concerns economic agency.
In contrast, neuroeconomics as "behavioural economics in the scanner" unhesitatingly assumes that economic agents are single individuals. If we take Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky"s prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 ) as the basic model from which most developments in the behavioral economics literature have been generated (cf. Heukelom, 2008) , then the rationale for assuming this is that their individual value function V is meant to function as an analogue to the traditional individual economic agent utility function. 1 A neuroeconomics derived from behavioral economics thus works from the assumption that single individuals (suitably re-represented) are agents for an analysis of how the different regions of functioning in the brain work together to produce the behavior of the single individual economic agent. This of course begs the question whether people function as single individuals. It is entirely conceivable that they do not, and indeed much social science as well literature from the humanities paints a more complicated picture. 2 Thus we could equally reason that different structures in the brain effectively produce different selves for people, and that individuals" interaction with others and their wider environments is segmented according to which of these selves and which of these structures is involved. People as single individuals do not interact; the different selves of people interact. Thus that you place one body in the scanner at a time does not imply that the behavior investigated is that of a single agent. Indeed it is a species of the mereological fallacy (Bennett 1 "As in utility theory, V is defined on prospects, while v is defined on outcomes" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 p. 276) . 2 For example, in social psychology social identity theory is quite ambivalent on the subject (cf. Brewer, 2001; Brown, 2000) . Wilcox the problem of how we explain "fusions of agency" (Wilcox, 2008, p. 527 rather look downward from the neighborhood of the "upper bound" where single individuals fuse in explanations that focus on the behavior of entire scientific communities. In the closing section of the paper I discuss the relation of the two strategies to one another in order to comment on the nature of the social-institutional space in which single individual explanations operate.
ii. Don Ross: Sculpting Individuals
Ross"s neurocellular economics understanding of neuroeconomics follows in the line of thinking initiated by George Ainslie and Paul Glimcher that starts with individuals" multiple selves (Ainslie, 2001; Glimcher, 2003) . 4 His conception of the individual (Ross, 2005 (Ross, , 2006 (Ross, , 2007  cf.
Davis 2007), we saw, characterizes individuals as collections (akin to communities or countries)
of optimizing sub-personal agents who interact in coordination games internal to the individual, and who also interact in coordination games external to the individual with other collections of sub-personal agents. Why begin with sub-personal agents? Ross takes the idea of an agent to be primitive and basic -an agent is "anything whose behavior is well modeled within the constraints of a small set of consistency axioms" (Ross, 2006, p. 247) , and then argues that neuroscience gives us good reason to see individual neurons and other neural structures as functioning as in this way as agents (Ross, 2006, p. 251) . Ross"s evolutionary view, then, is set out more explicitly in terms of social dynamics, or evolving forms of social interaction, whose pressures "sculpt" individuals into whole persons.
Central to this argument is a special role that Ross assigns human language. We know that humans are different from other animals in terms of their particular capacities for language. An especially important dimension of this is individuals" capacity to produce self-narratives or discursive representations of themselves. But as language is a capacity exhibited at the level of the single individual, individuals" self-narratives are representations of the whole individual that
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 10 on Ross"s argument emerge simultaneously as a result of the games played between an individual"s sub-personal selves and the games played between individuals as communities of sub-personal selves. The questions above about individuating the whole person, then, can be reformulated as follows: why should individuals produce single whole person-individuating selfnarratives rather than just confused speech that is not individuating? Why not a collection of self-narratives each representing different competing sub-personal selves. Ross" answer is that environments for social interaction are complex and highly interdependent, and so to play games with others whole individuals need to make themselves predictable. They do this so they can play and resolve coordination games with others. (To be predictable to others, they must be predictable to themselves, and vice versa.) Then all of this is compounded by the fact that nature doesn"t exactly partition games the way analysts do in game theory texts. A person can"t keep the various games she simultaneously plays with different people in encapsulated silos, so a move in a game G i with the stranger will also represent moves in other games G k, …, n with more familiar partners -because these partners are watching, and will draw information relevant to G k, …, n from what she does in G i (Ibid., p. 250).
The interdependent nature of games between individuals, then, constrains the games internal to individuals between their sub-personal selves to produce self-narratives that are recognizable as those of whole persons. For Ross, that is, "social dynamics are logically and ontogenetically prior to individual selves, because selves are sculpted into being by social processes" (Ibid., p.
257).
Note that this argument does not reduce to the simple (and potentially empty) claim that evolutionary processes individuate single persons. Evolutionary pressures indeed operate, but that individuals respond to them by producing self-narratives assumes a particular type of reflexive activity that goes beyond the idea of a dynamic feedback principle operating from social interaction to the individual. The idea of dynamic feedback itself is sufficient to make Dennett"s intentional stance idea, or intentional stance functionalism, involves explaining the behavior of non-human entities using the concept of intentionality. An intention in the most basic sense is an orientation toward something, and its representation is always in the form of language as in such expressions as "believes," "thinks," "wants," etc. Thus when we represent a non-human entity intentionally, we say, for example, that a thermostat "perceives" a change in temperature, or a computer "remembers" certain files. Dennett"s goal in authorizing such expressions is not to undermine the language of intentionality as associated with human intentions, but rather to free it of its traditional association with so-called internal states of the human mind, and in effect "externalize" its meaning by applying it to relations between things in the world. This arguably increases the power of attributions of intentions to all sorts of entities in the world, because rather than looking "deeper and deeper" into some sort of mysterious mind to understand those intentions, we are compelled to draw on features of the environment and the world to explain the nature of those intentions -a process understood as "triangulation" by Ross (Ross, 2005, pp. 49-50, 61) . Thus the intentional stance, as simply a principle of orientation requiring expression in a distinct kind of language, can be taken by all sorts of entities towards all sorts of things.
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A collection of sub-personal selves, accordingly, could conceivably take an intentional stance toward the individual as a whole just as they could than toward any other objects in their environment, and this "stance" could be characterized as a self-concept. In effect, the equilibrium values of a successful coordination game could include an orientation on the individual as a whole just as they could include an orientation on some other object. The language of intentions, it should be emphasized, has syntactic and semantic properties. Their semantic character supports their breadth of reference, while their syntactic character structures this reference. We thus use language syntactically in subject-object relationships, but subjects, or selves, can semantically speaking also be objects in language. Within this framework, Ross can thus say that the interaction of sub-personal selves within individuals combined with the interaction between individuals could tend to sculpt out whole persons. The argument is only an outline, because it is not clear just how the individual-individual interaction would drive withinindividual interaction to produce equilibrium self-concept type intentional stances towards the whole person on the part of the person"s sub-personal selves. Ross"s further thinking in this regard concerns the impact of evolutionary pressures on the individual self-narrative (cf. Dennett, 1991; Bruner, 1992 Bruner, , 2002 .
A narrative, including self-narratives, is a discursive structure that takes the form of a story from a particular perspective, and as such must have consistency and integrity as a single account of how events transpire for a subject or number of subjects. That is, a story must hold together, and in the case of self-narratives must do so for the subject at the center of that narrative (cf. Eakin, 2007) . Consequently, if a person"s self-concept is seen in extended form as self-narrative, the whole person is individuated as a single being as long as that person"s story retains its integrity.
Of course saying that a story holds together is very subjective, but Ross has a way of avoiding this problem. His view is that social dynamics increasingly sculpt the person by narrowing the possibility space the individual"s life occupies as the individual ages, so that the continually reduced space in which the individual"s self-narrative takes place always defines the self, even if the "story" never comes down to one simple final message (Ross, 2007) . This convergence argument arguably allows for a kind of dynamic re-identification of the individual as a single A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 13 being, because the narrative of the person at earlier points in time is always contained in the narrative of the person at later points in time.
The problem the view faces, however, is that of life reversals and discontinuities in a person"s story. Ross" convergence view relies on treating the person"s identity through time as a kind of continuity, but continuity itself cannot be assumed in his framework. Since social interaction influences individuals" formation of their self-concepts/self-narratives, large changes in it can contribute to significant changes and possible discontinuities in a person"s life story. Ross seems required to say that a new person emerges in such circumstances, but might we still somehow argue that the same person is there but with a new life and story? Ross in fact has additional resources at his command that might assist in this regard that he arguably does not fully exploit.
Thus he accepts Andy Clark"s idea that individual cognition is supported by external scaffolds whereby people offload to constructed and natural structures in the world those cognitive functions they are not especially good at while retaining and specializing in those functions at which human beings excel (Clark, 1998) . 6 From this perspective, we might argue that selfnarratives are not merely the product of individuals" interaction, but also reflect accumulated social cultural practices and inherited expectations regarding the form and nature of story-telling in the form of self-representation, thus functioning as external scaffolds to individuals" selfnarratives. Then, though individuals" self-narratives may exhibit reversals and discontinuities, from this perspective they might nonetheless be regarded as the self-narratives of single individuals in virtue of having been produced by means of this external scaffolding.
This argument obviously only outlines a way in which Ross"s argument might be extended to secure his relational single individual conception. It does so, moreover, by moving his argument upward from the lower bound of the range in which we speak about single individuals further into the social-institutional space than he takes it with his emphasis on the functional stance and 6 Clark"s (anti-Cartesian) idea of external scaffolds was developed following the thinking of psychologist Lev Vygotsky, and sees human mental processing, whether involving cognitive or motor tasks, as relying on found and created features of the external world (Clark, 1998, pp. 45-7) . Essentially we retain those activities at which we excel, offload those at which our external prosthetics excel, and use continually reconfigured combinations of the two to achieve our goals. Similarly Wilcox argues that we should see human cognition as being distributed across individuals and external cognitive artifacts in social systems of information processing "which implement external information representations and algorithms," and reduce "the importance of individual brains to economically important information-processing tasks" (Wilcox, 2008, p. 524) . concern of neuroscience, but it has been an important one on account of the development of neuroscience as a means of addressing mental illness, including schizophrenia. If behaviorally speaking people are "not themselves," then an ambition of neuroscience is to determine why and how they might be treated so as to be able to "be themselves." As we will see, whether particular individuals are able to "be themselves" is determined in neuroscience by comparing them to control groups of individuals who are specifically represented as able to "be themselves."
Neuroscience for Dumit, then, employs a relational conception of individuals, though one that explains individuals in relation to individuals in groups in which they share membership rather than in relation to individuals with whom they play games. Individuals still acquire their status as individuals in relation to other individuals, but only relative to social groups in which they are included which moreover exist only in virtue of way in which research is organized in the neuroscience community. Thus Dumit is clearly concerned with what I treat as the upper bound of the space in which we discuss individuals.
Dumit"s framework can also be understood in terms of Clark"s idea of external scaffolds, since neuroscience across its many constituent disciplines makes heavy use of a wide array of advanced technologies (all the apparatus of brain scans with all the supporting science, techniques, procedures, equipment, systems of organizing labs, etc. that scans require) which allows it to accomplish computational and information-processing tasks that far exceed and yet also simultaneously enhance scientists" natural abilities. In addition, Dumit"s emphasis on the organization of science opens the door to the main subject of Wilcox"s thinking: the social distribution of human cognition. Wilcox"s main view is that much of neuroscience and neuroeconomics is misguided in operating from a perspective of "cognitive individualism,"
meaning an undue focus on individual cognition, whereas his own view is that human cognition is socially distributed across individuals and social structures, so that different people perform different cognitive tasks in a general division of cognitive labor (Wilcox, 2008, p. 524 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 16 artifacts as scaffolding for cognition; add Wilcox, and we conclude that this scaffolding specifically supports a social division of cognitive labor that Dumit explains in terms of the multi-disciplinary, socially-located organization of a technology-based neuroscience. Thus on this combined view, the concept of "social-institutional" begins to be less the very general notion with which we began as we give it this more specific structural character as materially and socially distributed, a character, it should be emphasized, that can be described in dense detail and made quite concrete through Dumit"s type of anthropological research.
What does this then tell us about single individuals from the perspective of neuroscience and neuroeconomics? Recall that neuroscience as we saw it from Ross"s perspective begins with the problem of individuation and the task of negotiating the lower bound of the space where we talk about tipping the balance between the fission and fusion of single individuals toward the latter.
Indeed historically speaking neuroscience finds as one of the key rationales for its wider social existence the medical problems of mental illness, for example, schizophrenia, and the fragmentation of otherwise normal healthy single individuals into multiple or divided selves.
Then, how in fact does neuroscience actually approach the unhealthy and divided individual when we re-approach it now from the upper bound of the space in which we talk about single individuals, but rather in terms of tipping the balance from fusion to fission? Essentially, this is a matter of how the science community -working first with popular conceptions of what "normal human" involves -sets the neuroscience boundaries on what being a "normal human" means in the laboratory, and then takes this constructed idea of a single integrated individual as the basis on which particular individuals are evaluated as succeeding or failing to behave as such (Dumit, 2004, p. 59) . That is, we get whole single individuals not by assembly out of multiple selves, as in Ross"s framework, but by discerning who counts or makes it as a single individual relative to the class of "normal human" single individuals. Consider the steps involved in producing such a class, as in keeping with standard scientific experimental procedure, according to Dumit.
Page 18 of 25 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 17 First, one must isolate a sample of the "relevant" human population for scanning. 7 Second, a set of controls is imposed on this base group of individuals (for such things as smoking, a history of past depression, etc.), as well as for the state of these subjects prior to scanning (what each subject eats or drinks beforehand, their state of rest, instructions regarding how to behave while being scanned, etc.). Third, the individual brainset data produced for each subject scanned is normalized for differences in brain size, physical functioning, etc., in order that each individual"s "brain locations can be correlated with those of others," so as to produce a kind of average individual. There are many problems associated with the representativeness of these samples, but they go beyond the subject of this paper. 8 There are different types of normalization procedures -the original standard being the "Talairach brain" -but they all essentially adjust non-average individual characteristics toward the average. I also put aside here that various researchers intentionally "inflate" or "flatten" the scans they produce to enhance their usefulness in exhibiting phenomena of special interest (cf. Alač, 2004) .
Page 19 compatible with whatever empirical basis is at issue, and none correspond to it; an eliminativist view -no correct accounts are possible; and a realist view -no single theory or model is complete in itself but each satisfactory account captures some aspect of the world (Longino, 2002, pp. 91-2) . It is this last version of nonmonism/pluralism that I recommend in view of its realist commitment and the incommensurabilities that obtain between the two explanatory frameworks discussed here. scaffolding plays in human cognitive activity. That is, as these structures provide an account of cognition as socially distributed, they argue for an account of scientific explanation that is also socially distributed. Further, we may conjecture that Longino"s nonmonist/pluralist view that our different science explanations can only be partially successful explains why human cognitive activity has become socially distributed -something about which Wilcox-Clark are relatively agnostic. If our explanations are by nature incomplete, it not unreasonable to suppose that human cognition diversifies its activities to fill niches they leave unaddressed. On this understanding, then, we should expect "general" explanations of subjects, such as has been discussed here in connection with the question of what single individuals are, to be made up of dissimilar and relatively non-communicating sub-explanations whose relation to one another is always contested. The strategy for dealing with this problem of explanation here has been to set boundaries on the overall space in which such explanations can be said to lie. Understanding that overall space, I claim, depends on methodologically employing an understanding of it as distributed and complex. This seems well illustrated in terms of how the relatively incommensurate explanatory logics of Ross"s neurocellular neuroeconomics and Dumit"s social organization of neuroscience achieve different but complementary tasks in a distributed 9 Thus I reject the alternative unity of science view. Cf. Ross (2005) for an opposing understanding.
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 21 representation of single individuals. Such a framework also has the obvious advantage that it widens single individual explanation to allow consideration of such issues as multiple selves and membership in groups.
v. Neuroeconomics as a research program in economics
Recall the issue with which this paper began was whether neuroscience might sufficiently inform neuroeconomics so as to lead it to ask genuinely new questions in economics. Neuroeconomics of course is a new and novel research program in economics simply in virtue of its adoption of neuroscience as a basis for investigation of economic questions. But the extensive development of neuroscience and the independence of its scientific concerns from those of economics creates the very real possibility that economics will make only incidental use of neuroscience, largely confining neuroeconomics to corroborating existing theories and conceptions of economics. In this case it would be difficult to judge whether neuroeconomics has become a genuinely new research program in economics in the sense of being one that significantly impacts the development of economics.
My view of the matter is that the current status and direction of neuroeconomics is unclear. On the one hand, much neuroeconomics research seems primarily instrumental in nature in that it sees neuroscience as a means of securing further evidence for propositions which economists already have some confidence in or alternatively as an opportunity for settling existing disputes between economists regarding theory selection. This instrumental orientation seems unlikely to raise questions motivated by neuroscience"s own concerns that might inform neuroeconomics in ways that would have substantial impact on the nature of economics. 10 If this becomes the dominant form of neuroeconomic research, it seems that neuroeconomics will neither be a longlasting research program nor have a significant impact on economics. On the other hand, there is also neuroeconomic research that raises issues that have potentially far-reaching significance for economics, as I have argued in this paper to be the case with respect to research that addresses the boundaries of the conception of the individual. Other more far-reaching questions are likely 10 There is also the risk that neuroeconomics carried out on this basis will spend much time heralding "discoveries" already well established outside of economics.
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 22 being raised by other neuroeconomics researchers, but by its nature this more exploratory type of research is often difficult to recognize in its early stages. Thus it is likely too early to judge the significance of neuroeconomics as a new research program in economics. But I suggest we may begin to chart its progress according to how deeply we believe it is becoming truly engaged with the ambitions and horizons of neuroscience.
